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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
lsaac James Cantrell appeals from his convictions for trafficking in 
marijuana and DUI. Cantrell challenges the denial of his suppression motion, 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
The state charged Cantrell with trafficking in marijuana and misdemeanor 
driving under the influence (DUI). (R., pp. 25-26.) Cantrell filed a motion to 
suppress all evidence resulting from his encounter with police and subsequent 
arrest. (R., pp. 36-37.) The district court made the following findings of fact: 
The defendant, lsaac Cantrell, was stopped at 2:22 a.m. on 
January 28, 2008 driving the wrong way on 12" and Bannock 
Streets in Boise, Idaho. Within about a minute, Officer Tony White 
from the Boise STEP program, a specialized task force which 
evaluates drivers who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
arrived and parked behind the defendant's car and the other patrol 
car, both of which were pointing the wrong way on 1 2th Street. .. . 
The defendant failed to HGN test, his eyes were bloodshot 
and glassy, he was driving the wrong way on a clearly marked one- 
way street, he admitted he had been drinking, he exhibited difficulty 
in the divided attention tests, his speech was sometimes "thick," he 
refused to continue field sobriety tests, he said he did not know 
where he was coming from nor where he was traveling, under all 
the circumstances, the officer was justified in placing the defendant 
in custody for Driving Under the Influence. 
It is the policy of the night STEP team to impound cars of 
suspected DUI drivers unless the driver is only possibly close to the 
legal limit. The policy was implemented because drunk drivers 
often bond out, return to their cars and resume driving drunk. Local 
businesses are not happy when cars are parked on their lots after 
the drivers are arrested because the cars are sometimes left there 
for several days. The department also has concerns about claims 
being made about thefts from vehicles. The defendant's vehicle 
was parked illegally in the street and was pointing the wrong way 
so Officer White intended to have it impounded. In preparation for 
the impounding of the vehicle pursuant to the defendant's arrest, 
Officer White searched under the driver's seat and located a 
Tupperware container with four sandwich baggies of marijuana in it. 
The officer stopped, went to the patrol car and Mirandized the 
defendant. ... He told the officer there was a bong in the trunk. 
The officer opened the trunk and immediately smelled the strong 
odor of marijuana. He opened a green duffle bag and found two 
pounds of marijuana in the duffle bag. 
(R., pp. 87-90.) The district court denied the suppression motion, finding 
probable cause for the stop, probable cause for the arrest on DUI, a proper 
search of the passenger compartment of the car incident to arrest, a voluntary 
waiver of Miranda rights, and a proper inventory search of the car. (R., pp. 90- 
The case proceeded to jury trial, where Cantrell was convicted on both 
counts. (R., pp. 97-1 14.) The district court sentenced Cantrell to one year fixed 
on the trafficking count and probation for two years on the DUI. (R., pp. 130-34.) 
Cantrell filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 135-38.) 
ISSUES 
Cantrell states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Officers searched the passenger compartment of Cantrell's car incident to 
Cantrell's arrest for DUI. Has Cantrell failed to show either that the search was 
improper or that he was entitled to exclusion of evidence found pursuant to the 
search? 
2. The district court also found the search of the entire car proper as an 
inventory search. Has Cantrell failed to show error in this finding? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Search Of The Passenger Compartment Did Not Violate Cantrell's Rights 
Aaainst Unreasonable Searches 
A. Introduction 
The district court applied the m' rule and found that the search of the 
passenger compartment of Cantrell's car was a proper search incident to arrest. 
(R., pp. 92-93.) The Belton line of cases, however, has subsequently been 
partially overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. Arizona v. Gant, 
129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). On appeal, Cantrell asserts that the search of the 
passenger compartment of his car did not comply with the requirements of w. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-15.) This argument fails because the search was 
proper under the rubric of W t ,  and further because the exclusionary rule does 
not apply because the officer acted in good faith reliance on law as it existed at 
the time of the search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
' New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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C. Officers Properlv Searched The Passenqer Compartment Of Cantrell's 
Car Incident To His Arrest For DUI 
In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the Supreme Court of the 
United States rejected the "bright line" rule of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), and adopted the following legal standard applicable to the search of a 
passenger compartment incident to arrest: "Police may search a vehicle incident 
to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." W t ,  129 S.Ct. at 1723. 
Although the district court decided this case before the @mJ opinion issued, 
application of the new standard shows that the search of the passenger 
compartment was reasonable under the second of these search justifications: 
that it was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the DUI. 
Cantrell was arrested on probable cause of DUI. (Tr., p. 42, L. 19 - p. 43, 
L. 6; see also R., p. 92 (district court's finding of probable cause to arrest for 
DUI).) Officer White (the arresting officer) testified that the search of the car 
incident to arrest is "part of' his ongoing investigation into the DUI, because "in 
[his] experience" there is often evidence of alcohol or drug consumption "in close 
proximity to the driver's seat or the driver's compartment." (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-21.) 
Cantrell argues that "it would not be reasonable to search a vehicle for 
evidence of DUI." (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Cantrell's argument fails for two 
reasons. First, it ignores the testimony of Officer White. Cantrell cannot show 
error by merely ignoring evidence contrary to his position. The officer, who 
specializes in DUI investigations (Tr., p. 20, L. 10 - p. 28, L. Z) ,  testified that 
when investigating a DUI "it's been my experience we find a lot of [evidence of 
alcohol or drug use] in close proximity to the driver's seat or the driver's 
compartment" (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 13-21). Cantrell can point to no evidence in the 
record that would indicate that it was unreasonable to believe the car would 
contain evidence of DUI. 
Second, Cantrell's argument simply makes no logical sense. Cantrell 
argues that the only evidence of DUI is evidence that he was over .08 BAC and 
therefore no evidence could be found in the vehicle, and that the only "possible" 
evidence of DUI would be an open container, and it is unreasonable to look for 
such without evidence the suspect had been drinking in his car. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-15 (emphasis original).) Cantrell's view of what is evidence and 
what is reasonable is myopically narrow. 
Cantrell's first argument -- that the only evidence police can hope to gain 
in a DUI investigation is a BAC test -- withstands no scrutiny. A DUI trial does 
not start and end with a breathalyzer report. Evidence of consumption of alcohol 
or drugs would of course be evidence of DUI. 
Cantrell's second argument is without merit. To the extent Cantrell is 
arguing that an open container of alcohol in the car is not evidence of DUI 
because it is a separate crime, Cantrell has cited no authority for such a novel 
and counter-intuitive proposition. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 
966, 970 (1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 
1998). Clearly partly or completely empty alcohol containers in the car would be 
evidence of DUI. So would receipts from bars or other indicia of recent 
frequenting of a place where alcohol is served. Signs of recent urination or 
vomiting in the vehicle would be potential evidence of DUI, as would the smell of 
alcohol in the car or the presence of drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
Likewise, Cantrell's argument that it was unreasonable to look for such 
evidence in his case is without merit. Specifically, Cantrell asserts that "in the 
absence of some additional evidence that the driver was consuming alcohol in 
the vehicle" it would be unreasonable to look in the car for evidence of DUI. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) This argument ignores the analysis of m. In Gant 
the Court stated that "the offense of arresf will supply a basis for searching the 
passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein," 
noting that it was reasonable to look for drugs in cases where the arrests were 
for drug offenses. w, 129 S.Ct. at 1719 (emphasis added). Cantrell's 
suggestion that the officer must conduct an investigation of exactly where the 
DUI driver consumed his alcohol and may then search only if the evidence shows 
that he was drinking in his car is contrary to the analysis in m. Here the 
offense of arresf justified looking for evidence of that offense. As shown by the 
evidence and the law, it was reasonable for the officer to look for signs of 
consumption of drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. 
D. Even If The Search Had Been Improper Under Ganf Cantrell Was Not 
Entitled To Suppression Under The Fourth Amendment 
Even assuming that the search of the car was improper, however, Cantrell 
would still not be entitled to suppression of evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment. Where, as here, the conduct of the officer was objectively 
reasonable a defendant is not entitled to suppression even if there were a search 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether suppression of evidence was 
appropriate where the police had relied upon a facially valid warrant. The Court 
iirst noted that its precedents did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy 
for all Fourth Amendment violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06, cifing Stone v. 
M, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the 
individual, but is rather a judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect. 
&, 468 U.S. at 906, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1 974). 
The Court further stated that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts 
"substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial 
system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced 
sentences. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. When applied to actions of law enforcement 
taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice. &, 468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule 
should be applied only "'where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 910, quofing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of 
discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918- 
19. 
Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right."' &, 468 U.S. at 919, quoting Michiqan 
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Once an officer has obtained a warrant, 
there is nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, 
"[plenalizing the officer for t h  magistrate's error; rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." &, 
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on 
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." m, 468 U.S. at 922. 
Exclusion of evidence from the execution of an invalid search warrant is 
only appropriate where the magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew 
was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing 
magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role"; where probable cause was so 
lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable"; and 
where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not 
reasonably presume that it was valid. &, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
Leon's "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court in other 
contexts as well. in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested 
on an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was 
later learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but 
the court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in 
computer records. Id. at 4-5. Concluding that the officer's conduct was 
reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be 
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded 
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 14-16. 
Recently the Court decided Herrina v. United States, - U.S. -, 129 
S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an 
arrest warrant that appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement 
in a different county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the 
warranf had been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal 
possession of a controlled substance and a firearm was not required because the 
police conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence." Id. at 702. 
Suppression is not called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes are the 
result of simple negligence rather than systemic errors or reckless disregard of 
constitutional requirements. at 704. 
In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987), a police officer inspected 
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant 
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people 
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search. Id. at 344. Applying 
the reasoning of Leon, the Court concluded that the error in that case was the 
Illinois legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there 
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression. Id. at 349-53. The 
Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable; 
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. Id. at 356-60. 
The analysis of these cases applies in this one. Officer White acted 
entirely reasonably under the law as it existed at the time. As found by the 
district court, Cantrell was stopped for driving the wrong way on a one-way street 
and the police developed probable cause that he was driving under the influence 
and arrested him. (R., pp. 87-93.) The legality of the search incident to arrest 
was well established at that time. State v. Heer, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 
1154, 1155 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and 
finding search of car incident to defendant's arrest for DUI constitutionally 
reasonable). It was not unreasonable for Officer White to fail to anticipate that 
that the Supreme Court of the United States would, approximately 15 months 
later, alter the applicable legal standards. 
Because Officer White's conduct was reasonable and in no way the 
product of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or ... recurring or 
systemic negligence," Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 702, the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
E. The Exclusionarv Rule Should Not Apply In This Case Under The ldaho 
Constitution 
The search in this case was legal under the ldaho Constitution as it has 
been so far interpreted by its courts. State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 649, 651, 
962 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1998); State v. Heer, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 1154, 
11 55 (Ct. App. 1990). No ldaho case has, as of the writing of this brief, adopted 
Gant as the proper interpretation of the ldaho's constitutional search and seizure 
provisions. 
If this Court should, in this case or another pending case, adopt the Gant 
analysis as controlling under Idaho's constitution, then, as explained above, the 
search was still reasonable because it is reasonable to search a DUI arrestee's 
car for evidence of DUI. 
Finally, even if Gant were ldaho law, and even if the search were 
unreasonable under Gant, application of ldaho's exclusionary rule would be 
unreasonable. The state requests this Court to either adopt the exclusionary rule 
of the Fourth Amendment as applicable under ldaho's constitution or, in the 
alternative, to hold that exclusion would be improper under ldaho's standard on 
the facts of this case. 
1. The Exclusionary Rule Under The ldaho constitution Should Be 
Co-Extensive With The Exclusionarv Rule Of The Fourth 
Amendment 
The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was rejected by a 
two justice plurality2 of the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), overruling State v. Prestwich, 116 ldaho 959, 783 
P.2d 298 (1989). The state respectfully submits that Guzman should be 
In State v. Josephson, 123 ldaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), a unanimous 
court applied Guzman, holding that it applied retroactively, to reverse a district 
court's denial of suppression. 
overruled, and the law as set forth in Prestwich reinstated. Precedence of the 
ldaho Supreme Court can, and should, be overruled if it is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houqhland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). The 
Guzman opinion should be overruled because a review of its reasoning shows it 
to be manifestly wrong, and following persuasive reasoning of the United States 
Supreme Court would result in clarity and uniformity of the law and better meet 
the objectives of the exclusionary rule. 
Writing for the court, Justice Bistline reasoned that ldaho had adopted the 
exclusionary rule at a time when the United States Supreme Court had not made 
the exclusionary rule mandatory upon the states, and that the exclusionary rule 
ldaho adopted was more comprehensive than the federal rule. Because Idaho's 
exclusionary rule was designed to protect broader interests than preventing 
police overreaching, the purpose the Guzman plurality felt was the sole 
underpinning of the exclusionary rule in &, the Court reasoned that Idaho's 
history of application of the exclusionary rule was inconsistent with allowing a 
good faith exception. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 992-93, 842 P.2d at 671-72. 
The reasoning of the Guzman plurality is flawed for two reasons. First, a 
review of the ldaho cases upon which Justice Bistline relied does not support his 
conclusions. To the contrary, those cases clearly show that Idaho's exclusionary 
rule is co-extensive with the exclusionary rule as adopted and applied by the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, even assuming that the ldaho 
exclusionary rule serves the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable 
searches and seizures, deterring Fourth Amendment violation and protecting 
judicial integrity, the good faith exception as articulated in is consistent with 
those purposes. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality does not 
support its analysis or results. For example, the court first relied upon State v. 
Arrequi, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), the case adopting the exclusionary rule 
for ldaho. However, the court in Arrecjui specifically relied upon United States 
Supreme Court authority in adopting the exclusionary rule. Arrequi, 254 P. at 
791. Furthermore, the court, quoting a passage from an Oklahoma court that it 
"would not attempt to improve," went so far as to say that the "'guarantees of 
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures"' in the federal and state 
constitutions "'are practically the same,"' and therefore "'it follows without 
argument that the rule of evidence in the state courts, where like facts and 
principles of law are involved, should conform to that settled by the court 
having supreme prestige and authority."' Arrequi, 254 P. at 791 (emphasis 
added), quoting Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Ok. Cr. App. 1923). It is thus 
clear that the ldaho Supreme Court did not adopt an exclusionary rule for the 
ldaho Constitution different from that pronounced by the United States Supreme 
Court for the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor are the other cases relied upon in Guzman indicative that the ldaho 
Supreme Court had ever adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Rauch, 
99 ldaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), the court suppressed for failure to comply 
with the knock and announce statutes, relying heavily upon the "landmark case" 
of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The only mention of the ldaho 
Constitution occurs in the quote of a dissenting opinion. m, 99 ldaho at 593, 
586 P.2d at 678, quoting State v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 527, 174 P. 124, 129 
(1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting). There is nothing in the opinion that would 
suggest that the exclusionary rule in ldaho is broader than its federal counterpart. 
Likewise, in State v. LePaqe, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), cerf. 
den. 454 U.S. 1057 (1982). the court determined LePage's right to counsel had 
been violated under both the federal and state constitutions. The part of the 
opinion relied upon by the Guzman court for the proposition that judicial integrity 
is a factor in exclusion is actually a quote from two United States Supreme Court 
cases. In response to a claim that the issue had not been preserved by proper 
objection below, the Court stated: 
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the 
judiciary does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a 
manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both 
state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. 
While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly 
to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the 
courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the 
part of law enforcement agencies. "Courts . . . cannot and will 
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such 
invasions." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While "the imperative of judicial integrity" 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may not be the primary reason for refusing to 
allow the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it 
certainly requires us to exercise our discretion to review alleged 
errors that affect substantial rights and are "plain" in the sense that 
it is evident that a mistake has occurred. Accordingly, we turn to an 
examination of the merits of LePage's claim. 
LePa~e,  102 ldaho at 391-92, 630 P.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the part of the LePaqe opinion relied upon for the claim that ldaho's 
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal one, and therefore cannot recognize 
a good faith exception, actually states quite the opposite. The court specifically 
referenced both federal and state rights, drawing no distinction between them. 
The court also stated that the primary purpose of the rule is deterring police 
conduct, and the secondary reasoning is that the courts cannot be made a party 
to "certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies." This purpose is 
entirely consistent with a good faith exception as articulated in &. Finally, the 
Court does not rely upon ldaho authority for this proposition, but rather authority 
of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, nothing in the LePa~e  decision 
indicates that the ldaho Supreme Court was adopting or articulating any rule 
different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with the & good faith 
exception. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality shows that 
there is nothing in those cases indicating that ldaho's exclusionary rule is any 
different than its federal counterpart. To the contrary, those cases show that the 
ldaho Supreme Court has consistently looked to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in both adopting and defining the exclusionary rule in 
ldaho law. Because Guzman misinterpreted and misapplied ldaho law, it should 
be overruled, and the ldaho exclusionary rule be interpreted as coextensive with 
exclusion as required by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The second flaw of Guzman is its contention that the Leon good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated 
to police deterrence. The plurality contended that Idaho's exclusionary rule 
served the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures, deterring police misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant 
application process, preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing 
consideration of the evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 
Idaho at 993842 P.2d at 672. The United States Supreme Court persuasively 
addressed these concerns, explaining why they do not require suppression of 
evidence where the police have acted objectively reasonably. 
The Leon Court did not, as implied in Guzman, reject remedial or other 
concerns in the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-13. The Court started 
its analysis of exclusion as a remedy by specifically noting that exclusion is a 
court-created - not a constitutionally mandated - remedy. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
905-06. This remedy is sensitive to the costs it extracts, and is to be restricted to 
those areas "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served."' m, 468 U.S. at 906-08, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, because of those costs, tends 
to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. Thus, the Court had previously found limitations on the 
exclusionary rule related to federal habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; civil 
trials; where a particular defendant had no standing; in using the evidence for 
rebuttal; and refusing to adopt a "but for" standard for suppression. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 909-1 1. A rule that does not require suppression of evidence where the 
police have acted objectively reasonably in obtaining and executing a warrant is 
thus consistent with the limited remedial and other purposes of the exclusionary 
rule. The ldaho courts have adopted the same limitations on Idaho's 
exclusionary rule, implicitly recognizing the same balancing of the rule's costs 
against its benefits. 
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law 
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects. LePaqe, 102 ldaho at 
391, 630 P.2d at 678. The Leon Court addressed other purposes for the 
exclusionary rule and found them inadequate to justify excluding evidence 
obtained by a police officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in 
obtaining and executing a search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 921 n.22, 922. 
This authority and reasoning is persuasive, and should guide the ldaho courts in 
application of the exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution 
2. Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under Idaho's 
Exclusionan, Rule 
Even under the exclusionary rule of Guzman suppression is unwarranted 
in this case. As noted above, the ldaho exclusionary rule serves the purposes of 
providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures, deterring police 
misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant application process, 
preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing consideration of the 
evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 993, 842 P.2d 
at 672. None of these goals is served by suppression in this case. 
First, suppression in this case does not provide a remedy for 
unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time Officer White searched 
Cantrell's car the search was reasonable under existing legal authority. State v. 
&, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Ct. App. 1990). Applying the 
exclusionary rule would provide a "remedy" for conduct that was legal and 
reasonable at the time it occurred and could be deemed unreasonable only by 
applying law that did not exist until about 15 months after the search occurred. 
Such application would be a windfall rather than a remedy. 
Second, as mentioned above, application of the exclusionary rule in this 
case cannot conceivably provide any deterrent. Neither police nor anyone else 
will be deterred from disobeying the strictures of Gant by suppressing the fruit of 
searches conducted before Gant was even decided. 
Third, exclusion will not encourage thoroughness in the warrant 
application process because there was no warrant. Nor will suppression 
encourage thoroughness in the decision to search a car incident to arrest 
because officers will certainly be required to follow Gant now that that case has 
been decided. 
Fourth, there would be no "additional constitutional violation" by use of the 
evidence. Idaho's constitution contains no express or implied constitutional right 
to prevent the prosecution from using evidence seized pursuant to a search that 
was legal under the law and precedents existing at the time of the search. 
Finally, application of the exclusionary rule would not preserve judicial 
integrity. Quite the opposite would occur by applying the exclusionary rule in the 
context of this case. As noted by the Supreme Court, application of the 
exclusionary rule imposes substantial societal costs in allowing the guilty to go 
free. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. To mandate those costs without any benefit does 
not preserve judicial integrity. Likewise, to punish society because an officer 
failed to anticipate a change in the law that governed his conduct is not an act of 
integrity, but an act without reason. 
In this case the search was reasonable under the law at the time it was 
conducted. To date, the search is still reasonable under applicable authority 
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. If the law is to be changed to retroactively 
render the search unreasonable, then the exclusionary rule does not apply 
because suppression of evidence of a search that was lawful when conducted 
would not meet any underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule. 
11. 
The Search Was A Proper lnventorv Search 
A. Introduction 
The district court determined that the search of the car was also justified 
as an inventory search pursuant to its impoundment. (R., p. 95.) Cantrell first 
argues that the court erred by excluding evidence where other cars were not 
impounded, which Cantrell claims was relevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) This 
argument is frivolous because the court excluded the evidence based upon lack 
of foundation because the witness had no personal knowledge of what happened 
in those alleged instances - whether the evidence was relevant was immaterial 
to the court's ruling. Cantrell next argues that the impoundment of his car was 
illegal because Cantrell had passengers in the car. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19.) 
Cantrell's argument that the officer was required to hand over the keys to 
someone who did not own the car and had no permission of the owner to 
possess the car is also frivolous. Cantrell finally argues that the search was 
improper because the evidence did not establish an inventory policy regarding 
whether to open containers. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-23.) This argument, 
however, was not preserved because Cantrell argued below that the search was 
invalid and never asserted below that the search exceeded the scope of an 
allowable inventory search. Thus, Cantrell has failed to show error in the district 
court's holding that the search was a proper inventory search. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728, 730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. Cantrell's Claim Of Error In The Introduction Of Evidence Is Frivolous 
During the hearing on the suppression motion Officer White testified that 
the STEP officers generally impounded vehicles after a DUI arrest, within certain 
"guidelines." (Tr., p. 444, L. 19 - p. 46, L. 8.) One of those guidelines was that 
sometimes vehicles were not impounded if the suspected BAC was close to the 
legal limit. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 8-19.) One reason for this guideline is to prevent the 
DUI arrestee from returning after bonding out and driving the car while still under 
the influence. (Tr., p. 46, L. 20 - p. 47, L. 9.) 
In cross-examination counsel for Cantrell asked, "Isn't it true that persons 
with blood alcohol levels in the .16, . I7  and, in fact, as high as .2 within the last 
six months to a year have commonly not been towed?" (Tr., p. 76, Ls. 6-9.) 
Officer White answered, "Not by me." (Tr., p. 76, L. 10.) In response to further 
questioning Officer White stated that he did not know if other officers had failed to 
tow vehicles under circumstances that met the criteria for towing the car of a 
driver arrested for DUE. (Tr., p. 76, Ls. 11 - 19.) When counsel tried to impeach 
the officer with four police reports he claimed represented instances where 
officers did not tow despite a high BAC, the court held that such was improper 
because the officer lacked personal knowledge of the purported incidents. (Tr., 
p.76, L.21 - ~ . 7 8 , L .  I . )  
On appeal Cantrell argues the district court erred because the evidence 
was relevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Because the basis for the court's ruling 
is quite plainly lack of personal knowledge and the exclusion of evidence was 
under the standards stated in I.R.E. 602, Cantrell's appellate argument that the 
evidence should not have been excluded under I.R.E. 401 is frivolous. 
D. Cantreil Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Holding That 
The Car Was Properlv Impounded 
Officer White ordered Cantrell's vehicle impounded because he suspected 
Cantreil had a high BAC and because his car was parked illegally. (Tr., p. 44, L. 
19 - p. 48, L. 5.) Cantrell argues that the impoundment was illegal because 
applicable policy did not require impoundment of all vehicles upon a DUI arrest 
and because the officer failed to inquire "as to the availability any [sic] of the 
passengers to take possession of the vehicle." (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) 
Cantrell's argument fails because he has failed to provide any authority for the 
proposition that an impounding officer must affirmatively try to find someone to 
take possession of the vehicle. 
Cantrell's argument that the policy for impounding is unconstitutional 
because it leaves some discretion up to the officer is without legal merit. An 
impoundment policy can validly leave discretion to an officer on the decision 
whether to impound, so long as that discretion is exercised for reasons unrelated 
to whether the officer believes he will find evidence. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 
3-4 (1990). Here the discretion exercised by officers is based on judgment of 
whether the arrestee would be sufficiently sober to drive upon bonding out, not 
whether the officer believes evidence could be found in the car. Cantrell's 
argument that the policy is illegal for vesting some discretion in officers is without 
merit. 
Cantrell's second argument - that the officer was required to inquire 
whether one of Cantrell's passengers could take possession of the car - is 
without any legal support whatsoever. At best Cantrell's authority stands for the 
proposition that when the owner of the vehicle is a passenger it is generally 
unreasonable to impound upon arresting the driver. State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 
288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995) (cited at Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18). This argument is 
therefore not properly submitted for appellate consideration. State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported by citation to 
legal authority will not be considered on appeal); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 
952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
E. Cantrell May Not Challenqe The Scope Of The Search For The First Time 
On Appeal 
Only those issues either argued to or decided by the trial court may be 
raised on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 
(1 998). Cantrell contends for the first time on appeal that Officer White exceeded 
the proper scope of an inventory search because there is no evidence about the 
policy defining the scope of an inventory search. (R., pp. 19-23.) The record in 
this case shows that whether the inventory policy addressed opening containers 
was an issue never raised to the trial court. On the contrary, the only issue 
raised to the trial court was whether the impoundment of the car itself was done 
pursuant to a valid impoundment policy. Because the issue of whether police 
exceeded the scope of the search was not raised below (the parties only raising 
and addressing the issue of whether a search was at all allowed because the 
impoundment was illegal), Cantrell's improper attempt to raise it on appeal 
should be rejected. 
Cantrell submitted a memorandum in support of his motion to suppress. 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Request for Leave to File 
Supplemental Briefing and to Extend Time for Hearing (hereinafter 
"Memorandum"), exhibits to R.) In that Memorandum Cantrell asserted that he 
was entitled to suppression because his arrest was illegal because it was not 
supported by probable cause (Memorandum, at pp. 3-8) and because his 
Miranda rights waiver was involuntary (Memorandum, pp. 8-11). The state 
responded, arguing that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; 
there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the DUI investigation after the stop; 
the arrest was supported by probable cause of DUI; the search of the passenger 
compartment of the car was a proper search incident to arrest; the search of the 
trunk of the car was supported by probable cause and therefore reasonable 
under the automobile exception; and that the Miranda rights waiver was valid. 
(R., pp. 44-70.) The state mentioned the propriety of impounding the vehicle. 
(R., pp. 62-63.) 
At the hearing the issue of impounding the car was raised, with Cantrell 
arguing that the impoundment of the car was not done under a sufficiently 
specific policy because it did not require impoundment in every identical 
circumstance (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 11-16) and the state arguing that the impoundment 
was correct "as I indicated in my brief' (Tr., p. 112, Ls. 7-19). 
The reason that there is no evidence of what is the scope of an inventory 
search upon impoundment is because that issue was never raised. It would be 
inappropriate to fault the state for not presenting evidence on an issue never 
raised. It would also be improper to reverse the district court on a question it was 
never asked to decide. Because the issue of the scope of the inventory search 
and whether the policy allowed opening of container was never raised below, 
Cantrell is not entitled to have it reviewed for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying to motion for suppression of evidence. 
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